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DELIVERED ON MARCH 28, 2003 DURING THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE NORTHEAST REGION OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE HONORS COUNCIL AT GETTYSBURG, PA BY DR. JOHN J. BRENNAN, PRESIDENT Good evening, faculty and students of the Honors community.
It is good to be with you. Today you retraced the steps of those who
fought in the Battle of Gettysburg, and you visited some of its most famous
sites. You also shared with one
another your insights to what was the biggest and bloodiest battle of the Civil
War and the largest battle ever fought in North America. My objective is to provide an overview of the Battle of
Gettysburg from the perspective of the Union by discussing its political and
international context, its problems in putting an army in the field, Lincoln’s
difficulties in directing the war effort, the course and importance of
the battle itself, and the significance of Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address. My goal is to
stimulate critical thinking and discussion about this famous event and thereby
enrich your Gettysburg experience. When Abraham Lincoln was elected president in 1860, he
represented a minority viewpoint in American politics that was considered too
radical for the White House by many Americans, not all of them Southerners.
During his first year in office, he was criticized from all sides, even
his cabinet. In the off-year
elections of 1862, Republicans lost the support of the five most populous states
in the Union, barely maintaining their control of Congress.
Democrats in particular were upset over Lincoln’s harsh war measures,
his suspension of habeas corpus, his use of martial law and military arrests,
the fear of emancipation and the influx of freed slaves to the North that was
expected to follow, and they were joined by many Republicans in criticizing the
inefficiency of the war effort. In
mid 1863, the political future of Lincoln and his party seemed bleak as they
looked toward the elections of 1864. Fear of European intervention in what Lincoln insisted was
not a war, but a domestic matter and therefore protected in international law
from outside interference was also a concern.
The United States, expansionist itself, was vigilant against any
intrusion by foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere. But there was the danger
that the North’s blockade of Southern ports, an essential part of its war
effort, could become an excuse for European interference in the Civil War,
especially since the South was a major source of cotton for Europe’s textile
industries. However, a fortuitous
surplus of cotton and the possibility of turning to colonial suppliers had
lessened the need in Britain, Europe’s leading power, for the textile industry
to pressure Parliament on behalf of the South.
Indeed, in mid 1863 Britain had strong financial and economic connections
with the North and was probably more dependent on Northern grain and other raw
materials than on Southern cotton. Nevertheless, as a result of the Union’s
blockade, thousands became unemployed and restless in the textile towns of Great
Britain. Recent research supports a long-standing contention that,
in general, the British were divided on the Civil War, the aristocracy, upper
middle class and Anglicans favoring the Confederacy and Liberals, Dissenters and
the working class sympathizing with the Union. In the early stages of the conflict, however, Lincoln and his
Secretary of State, William Seward, were wary of the Confederacy’s vigorous
pursuit of foreign support. Reluctant
to further alienate Southerners, especially in the border states, by direct
association with the slavery issue, government pronouncements justified their
military actions as designed to save the Union. This approach did little to consolidate support for the Union
in Britain. Thus, as late as the
spring of 1863, British supporters of the Union cause conducted mass meetings to
rally public support, and a number of Afro-Americans actually traveled to
English textile towns to participate in the debates. After Lincoln’s dramatic Emancipation
Proclamation went into effect in January of 1863, British public opinion,
including that of labor, tended to favor the liberal and anti-slavery aspects of
Union policy, and eventually, after the death of Lincoln in 1865, they would see
in the defeat of the Confederacy an international triumph for democracy and the
cause of liberal reform. The final outcome of these developments, of course,
remained unclear to contemporaries at the time of the Battle of Gettysburg.
The Union had already been confronted with a series of neutrality related
international crises such as the Trent Affair, which provoked angry responses in
Great Britain and elsewhere. Then,
in the fall of 1862, Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, had proposed
to the Cabinet that they offer to mediate a settlement of the Civil War, a
process that would certainly have left the Union divided.
In view of the South’s many victories in the early stages of the war,
Cabinet members did not believe that the North was capable of conquering the
South militarily, but they were nonetheless divided on the proposal, and after
three months of discussion they decided to continue their policy of cautious
neutrality. The Confederacy’s last formal effort to gain Britain’s
recognition of its independence and international rights was carried out with
French support and did not end until June of 1863, uncomfortably close to the
Battle of Gettysburg. Studies of
how the North and the South were cooperating with British consuls in this period
show the North to have been more successful.
By late 1863, the Confederacy, having failed to gain recognition,
mediation or support from Britain would terminate its diplomatic presence in
London and expel British consuls from its territories.
But several other European countries had already joined Britain in
discussions on the mediation proposal. In
October of 1862, Louis Napoleon’s government in France submitted an armistice
proposal to the European powers, only to be rejected by Britain and Russia.
Undeterred, in January, 1863 France made a unilateral offer to the Union,
promptly rejected by Secretary of State Seward, to mediate a settlement.
Although France was officially neutral, Louis Napoleon resented the
Monroe Doctrine. Imperialist
designs may have motivated the French-led international expedition that invaded
Mexico to protect foreign financial interests in late 1861; they were clearly
involved in 1863 when France established a client state there which became a
base for diplomatic intrigue involving the Confederacy.
At the time of the Battle of Gettysburg, therefore, British policy
remained cautiously neutral while that of France was unpredictable, causing
uncertainty in Washington about the role of the European powers in general. In addition, Northern military success at the Battle of
Antietam Creek in September 1862 had been followed by renewed setbacks for the
Union, at Fredericksburg in December of 1862 and at Chancellorsville in May of
1863. Should the European powers
conclude that a stalemate was inevitable, the chance of intervention would
become greater. Thus Lincoln was
intent on pressing for a quick end to the conflict.
For one with limited military experience, he showed remarkable awareness
about how the war should be conducted. The
North had superior manpower, wealth, resources, infrastructure and industrial
production. Thus, Lincoln’s
intention was to apply military pressure simultaneously on several fronts.
Combined with the naval blockade of Southern ports, this strategy
promised certain victory. However,
there would be serious difficulties in implementing it. For one thing, Lincoln encountered obstinacy in his
generals who as professionals were reluctant to follow his lead in military
matters. Fundamentally, much of Lincoln’s difficulty stemmed from his lack of
familiarity with the technical language involved. He sought to resolve this dilemma by reading military
treatises borrowed from the Library of Congress and by appointing a military
liaison to his generals. But before
he was able to find commanders who would justify his confidence in them, a
series of changes in command were necessary, all of which raised additional
questions about the President’s competence in military affairs and contributed
to the numerous setbacks suffered by Northern forces in the early campaigns. Another serious problem was how the North would translate
its numerical superiority into a proportionately large fighting force.
In January 1861, the Union army had numbered a total of only 16,402
officers and enlisted men combined. When
the war began at Ft. Sumter in April 1861, Lincoln called upon the states to
raise a militia force of 75,000, and in May he asked for additional volunteers
and an increase of regular army and naval personnel.
Subsequently, after the humiliating Northern defeat at Bull Run in July
of 1861, a frightened Congress authorized the President to recruit up to one
million volunteers. By the start of
April, 1862, 637,126 men were in service -- enough, it was assumed, to assure
victory and, therefore, additional recruitment efforts were discontinued. Numbers alone did not reflect the true condition of the
Union army. Disease and casualties took the highest toll.
Absenteeism and desertion were commonplace.
In addition, a large army was not necessarily a combat-ready one.
Thorough training was essential in the North where military traditions
were comparatively weak. To contemporaries, one simple solution to these
problems was a still larger force. Thus,
recruitment was resumed by early June, 1862. But the recruitment process was replete with problems.
In general it was inefficient, varied from state to state and was slow in
adjusting to war time conditions. There was no guarantee of fair treatment at
the hands of locally appointed draft officials. Many localities raised funds for
use by local favorites so that when drafted they could purchase exemptions.
Exemption from service was extended to those who could provide a
substitute or who could contribute a standard $300. commutation fee.
But the most glaring abuse was the use of bounties by which volunteers
were paid cash to enlist. Used
widely to fill local quotas, it also opened the way to scandalous exploitation
by those who would accept a bounty, enlist, desert and then repeat the process
again as often as possible. The recruitment system was so unfair that it was the
occasion of public disturbances in seven states. Riots erupted in cities such as Albany, Troy and Newark.
By far the worst outburst occurred in New York City where from July 13 to
July 16, 1863 police were overcome, there was extensive property damage and
hundreds of people were killed -- most of them rioters, some of them innocent
Afro-Americans, who were apparent favorites of the federal government and
therefore deemed a threat to the jobs of the disproportionately large immigrant
population that was concentrated there. This
incident has been described as the largest civil disorder in American history.
To restore order, it was necessary to bring in federal forces, including
a detachment from Gettysburg. The density of Manhattan’s population created the
mistaken impression that more people were drafted in New York than elsewhere.
If lucky, immigrants might earn the average income for workmen of $1.00
per day, ruling out any chance of escape from the draft through exemption, while
the bounty system clearly favored the better-known and more trusted
non-immigrant Americans. Little
wonder that agitators were so successful in exploiting the fears of New York’s
immigrants, most of them having come from Ireland where they had experienced
abuse at the hands of an indifferent, even hostile, ruling class.
For those of us who are part of that cultural tradition, the episode
remains a heavy burden to bear, although we also remain justly proud of the
casualties that our ancestors suffered in courageous service to the Union cause
during the Civil War. It was not until March 3, 1863 that Congress finally
empowered the federal government to create the modern draft system. Although
substitutes and commutation payments were continued, the federal system
contained fewer abuses. However,
the course of the war remained so difficult for the North that opposition to
conscription on legal grounds would remain firm even after the eventual combined
victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. In addition, there was the ongoing problem of desertion.
It is estimated that the total number of Union deserters during the war
was 201,397. Ultimately, however,
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation
made possible the addition of up to 186,000 highly motivated Afro-American
troops, finally assuring Northern superiority in numbers. Meanwhile, in the wake of the Southern victory at
Chancellorsville on May 1-4, 1863, Robert E. Lee was having problems of his own.
Outnumbered by Union forces, Lee, “a brilliant tactical innovator,”
had deployed defensive forces to intensify attacks on parts of the Union line,
confusing and forcing the North into retreat.
But after the battle, Lee was disappointed over his inability to gain
“not an inch of ground” or to inflict greater damage.
Meanwhile, the Union offensive toward Vicksburg in the West prompted
Confederate generals to suggest that part of Lee’s army be made available to
strengthen Confederate forces there. To
Lee’s relief, Jefferson Davis supported his alternative proposal for an
invasion of the North, hoping for a decisive victory and confident that at the
least it would divert attention from Grant’s successes in the western theater
and hurt Northern morale. For Lee, the ultimate goal of the invasion was to destroy
the Army of the Potomac. Until that
might occur, however, there would be the opportunity to gain badly needed
supplies. On June 25, Lee crossed
the Potomac into Maryland, entering Pennsylvania on the next day, followed by
Union forces careful to position themselves in defense of Washington and
Baltimore. These maneuvers had the
curious effect of positioning Northern forces south of the Confederates during
the Battle of Gettysburg. It was a moment of great peril for the North.
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington and especially Harrisburg were in
danger of attack. Railroad connections were severed; business was disrupted;
farmers feared losing their harvests. Leadership
of the Army of the Potomac was in transition; in fact, General George Meade
would not be appointed Commander until as late as June 28, only a few days
before the start of the Battle of Gettysburg. Confusion abounded. Neither
army knew the exact strength or location of the other.
Lee, whose high command was recently restructured, lost contact with Gen.
Jeb Stuart who was supposed to keep him informed about Union forces.
Meade overestimated Lee’s force by up to 40,000 men.
On June 30, 1863. a small group of Confederates, seeking “commissary
and quartermaster stores,” sighted Union cavalry in the vicinity of
Gettysburg. In reaction, Lee
instructed his officers to probe Union positions there, but to withdraw if a
large Union force was uncovered. The Confederates enjoyed a numerical advantage when one of
Lee’s generals disregarded orders and launched the attack that started the
Battle of Gettysburg on July 1. Although
their resistance was fierce, Union forces were driven into retreat, managing to
establish and hold a key defensive position on Cemetery Hill, south of the town.
Lee made an on-site evaluation and decided that there was a chance of
success. In view of his many
earlier victories, this is not surprising.
However, Lee had been caught off guard, and the Confederates had lacked a
clear strategy on that day. Moreover,
Lee’s strategy throughout the Battle of Gettysburg would be offensive in
nature while the hilly terrain favored defensive tactics, and Meade would prove
to be very competent at defensive warfare. Early in the night of July 1, Meade, eager to engage the invaders, made his formal decision, based upon reports received from his field commanders, to give battle at Gettysburg. He did not arrive at the front until about one o’clock in the morning of July 2 and spent the remainder of the night and the next day overseeing the placement of Union reinforcements. Fortunately for the North, it was not until mid afternoon on July 2, by which time Union troop levels in the field were beginning to approach those of the Confederates, that a Southern offensive against the center and both flanks of Meade’s positions was begun. The fighting that day was conceivably the most intense of the Civil War. Ultimately, Union positions held, but Southern forces managed to establish a small foothold within Union lines at Culp’s Hill. Meanwhile, Meade continued using the North’s still growing numbers to further strengthen Union positions. At peak size, Meade’s army would number about 90,000; Lee’s about 71,000. Lee’s strategy on July 2 had depended on acting before Meade was able to get his forces fully into position. It could have turned the tide, but Southern forces that day had poor intelligence on Federal positions and lacked the necessary coordination and speed. However, the Battle was not over. Early on the morning of July 3, fighting resumed over
positions on Culp’s Hill. The
struggle lasted for many hours, most of it consisting of short range,
hand-to-hand combat, and in the end Union forces prevailed, leaving their
positions intact for the final stage of the battle later that day. Meade’s army now controlled the Round Tops in the south,
stretched for about two miles along Cemetery Ridge and then curved north on the
now formidable positions of Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill.
Opposite, Lee’s army concentrated, about a mile away, on Seminary
Ridge. Meade’s defensive
positions were so formidable that Lee should have considered withdrawal.
But Lee decided instead on a last ditch, all-out frontal assault. About 1:00 P.M., the Confederates began a continuous two
hour artillery bombardment. The
Union positions, though badly battered, held.
Then Confederate foot soldiers were sent across the plain between the two
armies. Shortage of ammunition
limited their artillery support. Deadly
Union artillery and infantry fire disrupted Confederate formations, leaving
thousands of casualties on the field. Somehow,
about a hundred attackers breached the Union line, but they were quickly
repelled. A diversionary attack by Confederate cavalry on the rear of
Meade’s lines also failed. Some
Confederate soldiers threw down their weapons and surrendered.
Others fled to the rear, defying the sharp shooters who were assigned to
deter deserters. As Southern
survivors fell back, Confederate lines were formed in anticipation of a Northern
counterattack that never came. Thus
Lee managed to withdraw his shattered forces, and, after having been entrapped
by the flood waters of the Potomac, he finally crossed to safety with his army
intact on the night of July 13-14. Lincoln
was profoundly disappointed. Although
weakened and trapped, Lee had been allowed to escape unhindered.
Lincoln feared that this development would seriously damage support for
the war in the elections of 1864. Thus, although Lee had failed to deliver a great victory
and had been forced to retreat from Northern territory, neither side took
comfort in what had happened. Meade
and Lee thought little enough of their performances that both submitted
resignations; they were refused. Lee
would be unable to muster another offensive effort on the scale of Gettysburg.
But his army would remain active in the field, conducting a war of
attrition, until his final surrender at Appottomax on April 9, 1865.
Henceforth, the Confederacy’s sole hope for success was that support
for the war in the North might decline, opening the way for a negotiated
settlement. On the North’s side,
even the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, the day after Lee’s defeat at
Gettysburg, could not assuage Lincoln’s disappointment.
In desperation, he would gradually adopt a policy of total warfare in
which the resources of the South would be destroyed and its civilian as well as
its military population would be punished into submission. The number of dead, wounded and missing during the Battle
of Gettysburg was approximately 46,000, about one-third of the total combatants.
Casualties were high for both sides: about 22,874 Confederates; 22,813
Unionists. The main difference in
weaponry from previous wars was the improved rifle that was used by both
Northern and Southern troops. It
was easier to load, more accurate and had greater range. Fired in disciplined volleys, rifle fire staggered, divided
and literally tore apart military formations.
Canisters of up to twenty small cannon balls were also very effective
when fired by artillery at short range. The
tight formations used by attacking troops were made to order for such weapons.
Contemporary accounts of the devastation on individuals are horrifying.
Bodies were dismembered or mutilated beyond recognition.
Young men in the prime of their lives were left on the fields of battle
during the nights that followed, groaning and crying where they had fallen.
Those who were recovered were treated without benefit of present-day
anesthesia or aseptic conditions. No
appreciable efforts were made to salvage damaged arms and legs, so that the
specter of amputees became commonplace in American communities, North and South
alike, during the decades that followed. About
twenty thousand wounded were treated in the private homes of the people of
Gettysburg, assisted initially by the skilled nurses of the Sisters of Charity
from nearby Emmitsburg. By nightfall on July 3, the remains of an estimated seven
to eight thousand soldiers were scattered about the field of battle.
For sanitary reasons, troops dug what proved to be shallow graves for
mass burials. But heavy rains soon
reopened the graves, while body parts continued to be found in the area for
weeks to come. These conditions
motivated the Governor of Pennsylvania to form an association with several other
states to raise funds for what would become a federal cemetery, and in time a
national park. When the dedication ceremony for the cemetery took
place on Nov. 19, 1863, relocation of the dead was still unfinished, and
tourists still roamed the area seeking souvenirs. Abraham Lincoln would give meaning and purpose to the chaos of the Battle of Gettysburg. Previously shrouded in myth, he has emerged as a fallible yet dedicated leader, a man of unusual integrity. To begin understanding the role of politics in his behavior, one can read chapter four, “A. Lincoln, Politician,” of David Donald’s Lincoln Reconsidered. Lincoln always acted within the constraints of the political party system, carefully gearing his words to his audiences. Thus, although firmly opposed to slavery, he spoke openly about relocating liberated Afro-Americans to colonies until after he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. However, in the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg he delivered one of the most important speeches ever made by an American president, his Gettysburg Address, a document which sought to ennoble what was a barbarous conflict by using it as the occasion for introducing a new idealistic platform for the identity and future of the American nation as well as for beginning the post-war process of reconciliation. Lincoln was not invited to attend the dedication ceremony
at Gettysburg until Nov. 2nd. Edward
Everett, the most respected public speaker of that day, delivered the main
address. Although it lasted for two
hours, it was magnificently prepared and delivered.
Audiences in that time were accustomed to speeches of great length,
thought for that reason to add to the solemnity of public events.
Lincoln listened, sharing a “dingy bench” with other officials on a
comparatively low, crowded stage almost enveloped by a surrounding audience of
about 15,000 people. Lincoln worked hard during the two weeks or so that he had
to prepare his address, finishing the first draft in Washington and then
revising it, probably at Gettysburg on the morning of the dedication.
The version that is accepted today was the result of subsequent revisions
done by Lincoln himself; he took his statement very seriously, as though he
foresaw its historic importance, and was unwilling to risk any corruption of its
phraseology. The words, “under
God,” were not in the original text; Lincoln added them extemporaneously
during the Address, and then incorporated them in his later revisions. The terminology and principles that Lincoln used were drawn
from nineteenth century liberal thinkers and had their roots in the thought of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Language
very close to “of the people, by the people, and for the people” had been
used by others, and the concept of a prevailing principle manifesting itself in
practical human events over the course of time was shared by contemporary
Transcendentalists. But it was
Lincoln’s unique use of language and his concise statement of principle which
assured that his words and thoughts would assume a permanent part in American
political thought. The Gettysburg Address consisted of 272 words divided into
ten sentences and, read with deliberation, took only three minutes to deliver.
With reconciliation in mind, Lincoln blamed no one for the war, never
distinguished between Northerner and Southerner, never mentioned specific
individuals, slavery or secession. He
was interrupted by applause five times and used only one gesture.
One tale has it that a photographer who was preparing to take his picture
could not get it done quickly enough. But
his shrill tenor, Illinois-Kentucky accent carried well, and his words had a
profound effect. They transformed
an extremely bloody military event, at the time unsatisfactory to both sides,
into a statement of principle that reminded Americans of the democratic values
that were at stake in the Civil War and, in particular, of the principle of
equality. The address opened with language that was certain to capture the attention of his Christian audience, improvised from Psalm 90, “Fourscore and seven years ago….” These words immediately connected the events at Gettysburg, not with the Constitution but with the Declaration of Independence, the fundamental statement of principle upon which the new American democracy was based. For Lincoln, the Constitution was an imperfect statement of these principles. It remained the ongoing task of subsequent generations to embody them more perfectly in everyday government and life. In this manner, Americans of succeeding generations shared in the creative work of democratizing the nation and the world, for the principles of the Declaration of Independence were meant for all people, everywhere. The immediate goal was to end slavery; other improvements, such as equality for women, remained to be recognized and carried out by later generations. For Lincoln there was no doubt about the political
significance of the Civil War. This
was the first nation in the history of the world to have founded itself; it was
the world’s first experiment in large-scale democracy. Anything short of victory by the Union would affirm the right
of a minority to destroy the government and demonstrate the inability of people
to govern themselves. Thus Lincoln
paid tribute to the dead who had fought for the cause of the Union and called
upon the living to give meaning to their sacrifice. In conclusion, comparisons can sometimes clarify the
relative importance of events. For
example, the Battle of Gettysburg ended a day before the surrender of Vicksburg
on July 4, 1863. Gettysburg
signified the failure of the South’s last-ditch effort to salvage its
independence by a great military victory. It
was no small achievement. Had Lee
succeeded, the position of the North would have been so desperate that mediation
of the Civil War by foreign powers, with all its harmful effects, would likely
have occurred. Although it is
questionable that a Confederate victory would have been sufficient to stem
permanently the tide of international opposition to slavery, it would certainly
have constituted a serious setback to that cause as well. The military implications of Vicksburg are clear.
The acquisition of Vicksburg enabled the North to dominate the
Mississippi River, extending its blockade of the South, and to isolate the
western secessionist states. Still, although both victories were important, neither was
important enough to be considered as the single most important military turning
point of the Civil War. But
together, they signaled the start of the lengthy process that was the War’s
end. The Battle of Gettysburg was also connected with the
earlier Northern victory at Antietam Creek, in September of 1862.
The same armies were involved, the Confederate Army of North Virginia and
the Union Army of the Potomac. In
both battles, Lee was forced to abandon a Confederate invasion of the North.
Antietam provided Lincoln with the opportunity to issue his Emancipation
Proclamation, while the Battle of Gettysburg inspired Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address. Linked together, these
documents prepared the way for
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment on Jan. 31, 1865, abolishing slavery in the
United States of America. Thus,
viewed as part of a single process, Gettysburg and Antietam marked the beginning
of the end of slavery and a new era in the progress of democracy and equality. Thank you for your kind attention. John J. Brennan, PhD President: NE-NCHC
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